Bank of England consultation paper Amendments to the Bank of England’s approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) Innovate Finance response

29th January 2025 | Consultation, Policy Blogs

  1. Introduction1.1 Innovate Finance welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Bank of England (BoE) consultation entitled Amendments to the Bank of England’s approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). In preparing this submission, we have engaged with a cross-section of our membership, including start-up and scale-up challenger banks. The banks are diverse in their market focus and specialist capabilities.1.2 We are supportive of the proposals outlined in the consultation and welcome a move to simplify the approach taken towards MREL, even as our response outlines concerns that the proposals do not go far enough to alleviate the disproportionate regulatory burden and uncertainty challenger banks face, which could impede these banks in supporting the UK economy's growth.1.3 In particular:
    • Innovate Finance welcomes the proposed reduction of MREL for transfer-preferred resolution strategy firms, under which MREL would generally be expected to be set equal to Minimum Capital Requirements (MCR). This recognises that the Resolvability Assessment Framework (RAF) provides sufficient assurance for transfer firms and more loss-absorbing capacity will now be available through the new mechanism to support small bank resolution in the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill that is currently before Parliament.
    • Innovate Finance also welcomes the development of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) digital payment portal as a means to facilitate bank resolution, potentially reducing the levels of capital that banks are required to hold to achieve an orderly resolution.

1.4 Both (a) and (b) as noted above will help the BoE to be confident that smaller banks providing a critical function (i.e. transactional current accounts) are capable of being resolved without needing to hold additional expensive capital in the form of MREL. Smaller banks that do not provide a critical function do not pose any systemic financial stability risks, and we welcome the confirmation that they remain out of scope of the formal MREL regime.

1.5 However, in our view, the proposals should go further in alleviating the disproportionate impacts of the resolution framework for challenger banks. As the government has made clear in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s recent Mansion House speech and its letter to the BoE, the UK regulator’s focus on risk in its approach to regulation has been at the expense of opportunities for growth in the UK economy. We consider that the BoE needs to recalibrate its risk appetite away from its internationally conservative resolution framework, which generally applies at a far earlier stage than the US and EU frameworks. The BoE has shown little willingness to develop a more proportionate MREL regime for smaller, simpler and fundamentally non-systemic banks. Given the BoE has no competitiveness or growth objectives, this is not a surprise, and we support aligning the secondary objectives across the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and BoE

1.6 Further, it is not clear how cliff-edge thresholds align to either the primary or secondary objectives of the PRA. The proposals continue to create a ‘cliff edge’ effect where banks either need to be very big or very small, which is not a good market competitive outcome as the result will be to favour the big, established banks and discourage competitors. Nor does it seem wise to incentivise banks that cross the threshold to get a lot bigger quickly via mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (witness various M&A activity in 2024 in second tier size lenders) which creates prudential risk.

1.7 Given the importance of challenger banks to the UK economy and to the SME sector in particular as challenger banks now provide c.60% of all SME lending done by banks in the UK, there is a serious danger that the proposed measures could serve as an unintended brake on these banks' ability to boost the economy. We support the need for robust regulation but do not support the BoE’s and PRA’s approach of extending the MREL regime for the systemic banks disproportionately to far smaller banks with far simpler business models. We support proportionate regulation, and we hope that the BoE will consider our proposals with this in mind, rather than a “race to the top” approach.

 

  1. Executive summary

We provide proposals in five main areas to improve the application of MREL to smaller, challenger banks to reduce the need for resolution while avoiding unintended consequences for economic growth.

(a) Factor in the prudential benefits of recent regulatory changes.

(b) Increase the asset threshold from £20 billion - £30 billion to £40 billion - £50 billion.

(i) Revisit the proposed indexation approach.
(ii) Provide further guidance on factors that determine a firm's risk level and the likelihood it will be moved to a bail-in strategy.

(c) Update the transactional account definition, and raise the threshold from 40,000 – 80,000 to 100,000 - 150,000 accounts.

(d) Reduce the disproportionate regulatory burden and uncertainty for smaller banks.

(e) Explicitly consider the risks and consequences of the MREL proposals for growth and the PRA’s secondary objective.

 

Read our response in full here

 

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